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ABSTRACT
Being able to predict a merger or acquisition before it takes place could lead to an
investor earning a premium, if they owned shares of the targeted firm before the merger or
acquisition attempt is announced. On average acquiring firms pay a premium when acquiring or
merging with a targeted firm. This study uses publicly available financial information for 7,267
attempted takeover targets and 52,343 non-targeted firms for the period January 3, 2000 through
December 31, 2007 to estimate (using logit) predictive models. Financial ratios are constructed
based on six hypotheses found in the literature. Although statistical evidence supports a few of
the hypotheses, the low predictive power of the models does not indicate the ability to accurately
predict targeted firms ahead of time, let alone with any economic significance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) process is one researchers have spent the past four
decades examining. M&A deals exist for both publicly held and privately held companies. An
advantage of examining publicly held and traded companies versus privately held companies is
the access to their (publicly available) company-specific financial information; most importantly
filings with the U.S. SEC and common stock price data. For this reason, most research examines
public company data. One reason one might want to predict mergers and acquisitions is that a
researcher can use financial characteristics and other public data in building a model to forecast
potential targets. A target is a firm that is being sought by another firm (the acquiror), which is
then either absorbed into, or merged with the acquiror. Being able to predict which firms are
likely targets would be beneficial for a firm who is looking to remain independent because they
―may alter their financial characteristics and hence forestall acquisition…Furthermore, there is
potential for individual investors to profit from knowing in advance which firms are likely to be
taken over‖ (Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq 1999, p. 3). The difference between a merger and an
acquisition is minimal and thus all deals discussed in this paper will not seek to differentiate
between the two. The minimal difference between mergers and acquisitions is that both types of
deals appear to possibly reward common stockholders because acquirors typically pay a
premium for the target company.
M&A deals generally begin with internal (private) meetings between the acquiror and the
potential target. If these meetings are satisfactory for both the potential acquiror‘s and target‘s
boards of directors, a Letter of Intent is sent to the target by the acquiror. The Letter of Intent is
a document which contains contingencies based on firm characteristics such as financial
1

statements, annual reports, a general breakdown of the customer base, and a review of
capitalization and ownership structure (Paulson 2000). This information can be extremely
private, therefore target firms need reasonable assurance that the potential acquiror won‘t steal
their proprietary information. This is accomplished through legal forms which protect their
sensitive information, such as a Non-Disclosure Agreement.
If these contingencies are agreed upon, then the two parties will proceed to the next step,
the Due Diligence stage. During the Due Diligence stage the target allows the potential acquiror
to see specific inner workings of the target‘s day-to-day operations. This can lead to a potential
conflict of interest if the acquiror walks away from (abandons) the deal knowing the inner
workings of the target. For that reason the contingencies listed in the Letter of Intent will contain
certain non-disclosure clauses regarding proprietary information being passed along from the
target to the acquiror.
If the Due Diligence stage proves satisfactory to both parties, they will seek an
appropriate financing arrangement. When determining appropriate financing, it is not
uncommon for deals to take months or years to be agreed upon (Paulson 2000). After financing
has been agreed upon (assuming a publicly held entity), shareholders must vote to approve the
deal. If the shareholders do not approve the deal, the acquiror may restructure the terms and
again attempt to gain shareholder approval. If shareholders approve and the board of directors of
the target firm remains interested in the deal, a friendly takeover may take place. The parties
then enter the stage of the agreement where the target‘s employees (or acquiror‘s new

2

employees) guide the acquiror‘s management by ―making sure the acquired company perform[s]
up to its purchased expectations‖ (Paulson 2000).
During the early internal meetings between the target and potential acquiror, the attempt
to acquire the target may be viewed by the target‘s board of directors either positively or
negatively. As stated earlier, if an offer is viewed in a positive way by the board of directors, a
friendly transaction may take place; however, if the target‘s board of directors opposes the offer
and the acquiror continues to pursue the deal, it becomes a hostile takeover attempt.
Hostile takeovers can assume many forms. One of these is a tender offer (cash tender
offers are illegal in the U.S. under the Williams Act). In a tender offer, the acquiring company
makes a public offer to the target shareholders at a fixed price above the current market price. If
50% plus one shares are tendered, the deal is successful. The acquiror may also work to attain
the support or agreement of a simple majority of the target‘s shareholders, whereby those
shareholders vote out current management and replace it with one that will approve the deal.
This is known as a proxy fight. Alternatively, the potential acquiror may purchase shares of the
target on the open market so they can appoint a representative to the target‘s board of directors—
this is called a creeping tender offer.
Gaining management‘s initial approval of a proposed acquisition is not the only concern
for a potential acquiror; financing is another. M&A transactions are rather large, with an average
deal size of $356M during the first five months of 2011 (Bloomberg 2011 M&A Outlook), and
financing may take more than one form. The acquiror may offer cash for shares of the target, an
exchange of their common shares for shares of the target, or some combination of cash and
3

stock. In an all-cash deal, the acquiror pays a fixed amount per share of the target‘s common
stock. In all-stock offers, the acquiror agrees to exchange its shares for the stock of the target.
According to Van Wyk (2010), the acquiror‘s stock sees ―negative drift in the year following a
takeover announcement‖ (p.15). Negative drift means that share prices of acquiring firms has
been found to decrease on average after M&A deals have been announced.
The next step of the M&A process is for the acquiring firm to seek majority shareholder
approval. Target firms may already have in place different safeguards designed to protect
themselves in the event of a hostile takeover attempt. One such measure is simply increasing the
proportion of shareholders needed to approve a takeover to a supermajority. Supermajority
shareholder approval is a requirement for shareholder approval which is above 50% plus one
shares. The purpose is to decrease the likelihood of shareholder approval of a takeover. Another
measure the target firm may enact is a poison pill. A poison pill allows all but majority
shareholders to buy new shares at a discount—this can greatly increase the purchase price of a
target firm, if the target is being sought by an outside acquiror.
In the event the acquiring firm achieves a shareholder majority, a transaction may occur.
As discussed earlier, these deals may have rather large stock price movements, which means
investors may be able to profit. Investors looking to profit from M&A transactions are usually
looking to receive the typical premium, paid by the acquiror, over the target‘s share price as of
the announcement date. To do this, the investor must be holding the target firm in their portfolio
when the potential takeover is announced. The majority (45%) of premiums paid by acquirors
during 2010 were under 10%, 15% of premiums were in the 10%-25% range, and 30% of deals
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resulted in a premium between 25% and 50% (Bloomberg 2011 M&A Outlook). If investors
hold just a small number of these target stocks in their portfolio, they may earn returns greater
than their benchmark (termed abnormal returns).
This research project attempts to develop a model to predict potential targets. Only a few
researchers have built models which produce the desired results. Therefore, the goal of this
paper is to design and estimate a model of M&A target identifications which is superior to those
found in the existing literature.

5

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Predicting potential targets of an M&A deal using financial characteristics began with the
work of Simkowitz and Monroe (1971). Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) find evidence of a
difference in financial characteristics between target firms and acquiring firms. Using a multiple
discriminant model, they find that targets have smaller market capitalization, lower price-toearnings (P/E) ratios, lower dividend payout ratios, and lower equity growth than that of their
acquiring firm counterparts. A potential flaw of multiple discriminant analysis is the underlying
assumptions of the model which tend to inflate its predictive ability (Palepu 1986). Multiple
discriminant analysis assumes normality of data, uses equal-size (referred to as equal-share)
samples of both targets and non-targets (any firm that is not a target), and assumes equality of
dispersion matrices. Nevertheless, their study provides a framework for predicting mergers and
acquisitions from differences in the target and acquiring firms‘ financial characteristics.
Stevens (1973) finds evidence contrary to the findings of Simkowitz and Monroe (1971).
He finds that liquidity is an important factor differentiating between targets and acquiring firms,
but not the dividend payout ratio or P/E ratios. Stevens (1973) uses a model similar to that of
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) which may therefore indicate an inflated predictive ability. The
conflicting view of these researchers and others—for example, Castagna and Matolcsy (1976),
Belkoui (1978), and Dietrich and Sorenson (1984)—led to the formulation of six hypotheses
about mergers and acquisitions. They are: the Inefficient Management Hypothesis, the GrowthResource Mismatch Hypothesis, the Industry Disturbance Hypothesis, the Firm Size Hypothesis,
the Asset Undervaluation Hypothesis, and the Price-to-Earnings (P/E) Hypothesis.
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The Inefficient Management Hypothesis ―is based on the finance theory premise that
acquisitions are a mechanism by which managers of a firm who fail to maximize its market value
are replaced‖ (Palepu 1986). Inefficient management has been proxied by a number of variables
that are expected to be inversely related to the likelihood of a takeover. These variables relate to
profitability, dividends and dividend growth, or average excess stock return. Palepu (1986),
Barnes (1999), Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq (1999), and Cudd and Duggal (2000) find evidence
supporting this hypothesis.
The Growth-resource Mismatch Hypothesis is based on the notion that a mismatch
between a firm‘s growth and its financial resources make the firm a likely target. This ―implies
that two types of firms are likely targets: low-growth, resource-rich firms and high-growth,
resource-poor firms‖ (Palepu 17). The variables used to proxy this hypothesis are sales growth,
liquidity, leverage, and slight variations thereof and are expected to be directly (positively)
related to the probability of a takeover. These variables are ―commonly put forward in the
popular financial press as well as in corporate finance textbooks‖ (Palepu 17). Palepu (1986),
Barnes (1999), Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq (1999), Cudd and Duggal (2000), Powell (2004),
Camerlynck, Ooghe, and Langhe (2005), Baixauli (2009), and Pervan (2010) find evidence
supporting this hypothesis.
The Industry Disturbance Hypothesis is based on ―economic disturbance theory [which]
suggests that acquisitions cluster by industry. A factor that signals the acquisition likelihood of a
firm is, therefore, the recent history of acquisitions in its industry‖ (Palepu 18). This direct
influence is proxied by a dummy variable signifying whether or not there has been any M&A
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activity in the appropriate sector during the previous fiscal year (prior to observation). Palepu
(1986) and Cudd and Duggal (2000) find evidence supporting this hypothesis.
The Firm Size Hypothesis proposes that smaller firms are likely to be takeover targets,
similar to the findings of Simkowitz and Monroe (1971). This idea is based on the premise that
smaller firms have less ―transaction cost‖ associated with being takeovers than larger firms. If a
hostile takeover attempt occurs, smaller firms are unlikely to be able to ―defend‖ themselves
against a larger acquiror. Palepu (1986), Cudd and Duggal (2000), Alcalde and Espitia (2003),
and Pervan (2010) find an inverse relationship between firm size and takeover probability.
The Asset Undervaluation Hypothesis claims that firms with lower market-to-book ratios
are more likely to be targets because they are ―cheap‖ relative to their higher market-to-book
counterparts. Since market-to-book value is based on accounting principles and not underlying
asset prices, this hypothesis seems arbitrary. Baixauli (2009) finds evidence supporting this
hypothesis.
The Price-to-Earnings Hypothesis suggests firms with lower P/E ratios are more likely to
be acquired than those with higher P/E multiples. Palepu 1986 claims:
―According to the proponents of this hypothesis, bidders with high P/E ratios seek to
acquire low P/E firms to realize an ‗instantaneous capital gain‘ because of the belief that
the stock market values the earnings of the combination at the higher P/E ratio of the
acquiror‖ (p. 18).
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This variable, like the Asset Undervaluation Hypothesis, also suggests that firms with lower P/E
ratios are ―undervalued‖ compared to their higher P/E ratio counterparts, possibly fueling a
―bargain‖ takeover process.
These six hypotheses were examined jointly by Palepu (1986). Palepu (1986) corrects the
methodology of past researchers, such as Stevens (1973), by using modeling techniques which
incorporate more robust assumptions allowing the model to be less biased in its predictive
ability. He uses a logit model, which can handle more robust (non-normal) data, rather than a
binary model (such as multiple discriminant analysis). He also uses non-equal share samples,
which further reduces bias in his modeling technique. The use of a logit model requires an
optimal cut-off probability be assumed, developed, and chosen (because a logit model estimates
a potential target‘s probability of being acquired, not a yes/no (0, 1) decision.) The
determination of an optimal cut-off probability is critical in decision-making because a lower
cut-off can potentially misclassify too many non-target firms as potential targets, and could
possibly erase any potential abnormal returns (assuming equal weightings of potential targets in
the portfolio). In contrast, too high a cut-off probability will potentially misclassify target firms
as non-targets, producing a portfolio with too few securities to be well-diversified. The
performance of a poorly diversified portfolio is too dependent on the performance of each
security in it.
Palepu‘s (1986) model has a target predictive ability of 80% and a non-target predictive
ability of 45%. According to him, ―the strategy of investing in the 625 [out of the possible
1,117] firms identified by the model to be potential targets is found to result in statistically
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insignificant excess returns‖ (p. 32). He did, however, find support for four of the six academic
hypotheses—Inefficient Management Hypothesis, Growth-resource Mismatch Hypothesis,
Industry Disturbance Hypothesis, and Size Hypothesis.
Barnes (1999) develops a new way to determine the optimal cut-off probability—sorting
financial characteristics data by sector. He suggests that Palepu‘s (1986) ―criterion of error
minimization is inappropriate if out-performance of the market is the objective.‖ (p. 297) In its
place, he uses a ―profit-maximization criteria‖ which, alas, does not yield positive abnormal
returns nor increase his model‘s predictive power relative to Palepu‘s (1986). Barnes (1999) also
uses what he calls industry-adjusted data. These are financial data which are normalized by
sector or industry. Normalizing the data accounts for industry-specific dispersions. One takes
the observed value for a firm, subtracts the industry mean and divides by the industry standard
deviation (this is also referred to as an industry-relative ratio). While not producing positive
abnormal investment returns, Barnes‘ models ―perform better than chance‖ (p. 283). Cudd and
Duggal (2000) verify the ability of industry-relative ratios to ―convey significant additional
information‖ (p. 117).
Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq (1999) create a prediction model based on non-financial as
well as financial characteristics. They find evidence supporting five of their non-financial
characteristic hypotheses: the Control Hypothesis, the Attitude Hypothesis, the Previous Bids
Hypothesis, the Litigation Hypothesis, and the Other Hypothesis. They explain their hypotheses
as follows:
The Control Hypothesis suggests that there is a relationship between the degree of control
officers have over the board and the probability of actual takeover occurring.
10

The Attitude Hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between a friendly takeover
attempt and the likelihood of firm being merged or acquired.
The Previous Bids Hypothesis suggests that the number of previous bids is positively
related to the likelihood of being taken over.
The Litigation Hypothesis brings in the dimension of legal issues arising in a takeover. It
is hypothesized that an inverse relationship exists between the presence of litigation and
the likelihood of a targeted firm being taken over.
The Other Hypothesis suggests an inverse relationship between the existence of other
ongoing acquisition plans by the target or bidder (Other) and the likelihood of a targeted
firm being taken over. (Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq (1999), pgs. 9-11)
With proxies for these hypotheses, their model has a predictive accuracy of 62.9%, which
is less than their financial characteristic model, which has 74.5% accuracy. This suggests the
need for a model inclusive of both financial and non-financial characteristics.
Powell (2004) attempts to determine the appropriate method for estimating an optimal
cut-off probability. He adds another non-financial variable: whether the proposed takeover is
hostile or friendly. He claims that ―multinomial (multiple variables) models generate significant
and positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns when a strategy of predicting hostile targets only is
adopted‖ (p.63). While admitting that his model misclassifies large numbers of non-targets as
hostile targets, he argues ―hostile multinomial portfolio reveals that while hostile targets
correctly predicted by the model generate large positive abnormal returns, firms misclassified as
hostile targets also earn positive abnormal returns‖ (p.63). He explains further that ―hostile
targets…are larger in size, so the multinomial model, by design, ‗filters out‘ firms that are more
likely to be in financial distress, giving rise to a portfolio with positive abnormal returns‖ (p.63).
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The insight provided by Palepu (1986), Barnes (1999), Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq
(1999), and Powell (2004) have shaped the prediction literature to be more accurate, less biased,
and inclusive of non-financial data. The goal of this paper is to develop a model that
incorporates parts from each of these prior studies and to estimate that model using the logit
specifications and more recent available data.
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3. DATA AND METHODS
3.1 Target Firm Data
Target firm data was collected from the SDC database for the time period January 3,
2000 through December 31, 2007. There were 82,617 target firms found during that time period.
Of those target firms found, 7,267 had all of the available data needed to create the variables
used in this study. A target is defined as a firm that was merged into or acquired by another firm
or attempted to be merged or acquired within a particular year. It is very common for a target
firm to have multiple observations as a non-target in prior years, but only be considered a target
in the year it was acquired or attempted to be acquired. Figure 1 shows the number of targets in
each year of the period studied. The smaller bars in Figure 1 indicate the number of firms for
which the merger or acquisition attempt was successful. Figure 1 shows that there was very
heavy M&A activity during the initial years of the period studied. A decline in M&A activity
took place after 2000-2002 and M&A activity became more stable. Figure 1 indicates that a very
low percentage of target firms are successfully acquired.
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Figure 1: Total Targets for Time Frame (1/3/00 – 12/31/07)
Attempted Target M&A

Successful Target M&A

2450

1274
871
638
128
2000

111
2001

50
2002

614

571
59

49

2003

430

422

2004

56
2005

34
2006

46
2007

3.2 Non-Target Firm Data and Variable Specifications
The non-target data was collected from the WRDS database. 91,763 non-target firm
observations were collected and of those there were 52,343 which had all of the necessary
information available for the variables used in this study. The variables used in this study are
described below in Table 1.
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Table 1: Description of Variables

Variables
Return on Equity
Growth-Resource Dummy
Leverage
Liquidity
Industry Dummy
Size
Market-To-Book
Price-To-Earnings

Description
Net Income / Common Equity
1 if firm has low growth-high liquidity-low leverage, or
high growth-low liquidity-high leverage, 0 if otherwise
Net Debt / Common Equity
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
1 if takeover attempt occurred in prior year sector, 0 if
otherwise
Total Assets
Market Value (4 weeks prior to announcement) / Book
Value
Share price (4 weeks) prior to announcement / Earnings per
Share

*Note: all balance sheet and income statement items cover the last twelve months

Following Palepu (1986), the Growth-Resource Dummy is 1 for ―low-growth, resource-rich
firms and high-growth, resource-poor firms‖ and 0 otherwise. Palepu (1986) defines high
growth as five-year average revenue growth rate greater than the industry mean. The GrowthResource Dummy in this study defines high growth as return on equity greater than the industry
mean. This is an upward biased measure due to the ability of a company to payout some of its net
income. Two companies with the same return on equity may be growing differently due to the
company‘s retention ratio (percent of net income retained). The Liquidity, Size, Industry
Dummy, Market-to-Book Ratio, and Price-to-Earnings variables follow Palepu (1986) as noted
in Table 1. The Leverage variable used in this study is defined slightly differently from Palepu‘s
(1986) total debt-to-equity ratio. The Industry Dummy variable ―…suggests that acquisitions
cluster by industry‖ (Palepu 18). This variable takes a value of 1 when a particular industry had
M&A activity during the previous year.
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3.3 Target and Acquiror Fims
The data in Table 2 display the respective means of target and acquiror firms for the
explanatory variables. Data for the 7,267 target and 7,267 acquiror firms was gathered from the
SDC Database.
Table 2: Target‘s Versus Acquirors

Target

Acquiror

Return on Equity

-0.494

0.099

Liquidity (Current Ratio)

3.138

3.087

Leverage (Net Debt/Common
Equity

1.358

0.124

4160.127

5625.237

Market-to-Book Ratio

5.510

3050.88

Price-to-Earnings Ratio

16.313

40.566

Size (Total Assets)

The differences between the target return on equity and acquiror return on equity mean
values for the independent variables suggest target firms performed worse (lower ROE) than
acquirers. This is in agreement with the Inefficient Management Hypothesis which states
―managers of a firm who fail to maximize its market value are replaced‖ (Palepu p. 16). This
finding confirms the work of Palepu (1986), Barnes (1999), Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq (1999),
and Cudd and Duggal (2000).
The minimal difference between target liquidity and acquiror liquidity suggests that
targets have a current ratio similar to those of their non-target counterparts. The liquidity proxy
16

is a component of the GRDummy variable which ―implies that two types of firms are likely
targets: low-growth, resource-rich firms and high-growth, resource-poor firms‖ (Palepu p. 17).
The targets found in this study appear to be resource-rich firms.
The difference between mean target leverage (LEV) and mean acquiror leverage shows
that acquirors had on average only twelve cents of debt per dollar of equity compared to targets
which was more than ten times that amount. The leverage difference shown in Table 2 may have
been a function of what took place during the turn of the 21st century—the credit crisis. The
relaxed federal regulation of commercial banks paired with artificially low interest rates created
a loose credit environment. This in turn could explain the higher return on equity for targets
which were able to lever up returns. Since this study ends in fiscal year 2007, the whole picture
cannot be seen as the Great Recession began in the early parts of 2008.
The mean size differential between targets and acquirors confirms the Firm Size
Hypothesis, which claims that smaller firms are more likely to be takeover targets. This is
similar to the findings of Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) and in-line with the findings of Palepu
(1986), Cudd and Duggal (2000), Alcalde and Espitia (2003), and Pervan (2010).
The differences between the target and acquiror market-to-book ratios (MTB) offers
support for the Asset Undervaluation Hypothesis which claims firms with lower market-to-book
ratios are considered cheap compared to their high market-to-book counterparts. This supports
the findings of Baixauli (2009). The reason the average acquiror market-to-book ratio is
significantly higher than the target average is from eight acquirors having MTB ratios over one
million.
17

Finally, the lower target mean price-to-earnings ratio compared to acquiror price-toearnings ratio is in-line with the Price-to-Earnings Hypothesis which posits firms with lower P/E
multiples are more likely to be acquired than those with higher P/E multiples.
3.4 Model Specifications and Observation Normalization
The logistic regression tests are conducted for three different samples of the available
data. The first test is the Control Model, analogous to Palepu‘s (1986) model in explanatory
variables used and analogous to Barnes (1999) in terms of the method used to transform the data.
The data was transformed by a process called normalization. For the estimated models, all data
were normalized by industry. To normalize a variable means the following:

Where X is the observed value found in the population, µ is the industry mean for that particular
variable, and σ is the industry standard deviation for a particular variable. The minimum and
maximum values for normalized data can be construed as how many standard deviations that
value was above or below the industry mean.
The first test excludes observations in which any variables have a negative value (before
normalization). The Semi-Relaxed (second) Model replaces the Price-to-Earnings variable with
Net Income and includes observations in which Net Income is either positive or negative (before
normalization). The Relaxed (third) Model replaces the Net Income variable in place of the
Price-to-Earnings variable and includes all observations. Since the Semi-Relaxed and Relaxed
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Models include the Net Income variable with negative observations, the Return on Equity (Net
Income / Common Equity) variable will also have negative observations.
3.5 Expectations of Estimated Models
The expectations for parameter estimates based on the six hypotheses (described earlier)
are listed in Table 3. These are identical to Palepu‘s (1986) expectations.
Table 3: Expectations of Test Results

Hypothesis
Inefficient Management
Growth-Resource
Mismatch
Industry Disturbance
Firm Size
Asset Undervaluation
Price-to-Earnings

Variable
Return on Equity (ROE)
GRDUMMY
LIQ
LEV
IDUMMY
SIZE
MTB
PE
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Parameter
Expected
Sign
+
+
-

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Control Model Summary
Summary statistics for the target data (normalized) used in the Control Model are found
below in Table 4. Summary statistics for the non-target data (normalized) used in the Control
Model are found in Table 5.
Table 4: Target Summary Statistics for the Control Model

Variables

Mean

Return on Equity
Liquidity
Leverage
Size
Market-To-Book
Price-To-Earnings
Industry Dummy
Growth-Resource Dummy

.079
.280
-.083
.520
.024
.035
.775
.335

Std. Dev.

Minimum

3.357
-2.048
2.318
-9.841
.877
-2.721
4.184
-1.126
1.026
-1.639
1.855
-2.350
.418
0
.472
0
Observations = 4,896

Maximum
152.906
99.195
24.073
139.160
24.198
107.702
1
1

Table 5: Non-target Summary Statistics for the Control Model

Variables

Mean

Return on Equity
Liquidity
Leverage
Size
Market-To-Book
Price-To-Earnings
Industry Dummy
Growth-Resource Dummy

.001
.158
-.046
.464
.020
.007
.759
.323

Std. Dev.

Minimum

1.013
-1.641
2.001
-2.974
1.091
-5.841
5.659
-1.584
1.394
-1.885
1.304
-38.636
.427
0
.468
0
Observations = 19,328
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Maximum
40.365
178.356
54.719
307.310
97.592
104.729
1
1

For every data sample (observations in Control Model, Semi-Relaxed Model, and Relaxed
Model), there is information across 70 industries—an industry being defined by the first two
numbers of a firm‘s SIC code. The logistic regression (logit) for the Control Model uses the
normalized data summarized in Exhibits 5 and 6. The estimated model is shown in Table 6.
Statistical significance is derived from the p-value having a value less than .05.
4.1.1 Control Model Estimation
Pi = Prob (TAKEOVERi = | ROEi, GRDUMMYi, LIQi, LEVi, IDUMMYi, SIZEi, MTBi, PEi)
where TARGETi = 1 if firm I was targeted and TARGETi = 0 if firm I was not targeted.
P(TARGETi) = α + β1ROEi + β2GRDUMMYi + β3LIQi + β4LEVi + β5IDUMMYi + β6SIZEi +
β7MTBi + β8PEi
Table 6: Estimated Control Model

Logistic Regression

Number of Observations
LR chi-squared(8)
Prob > Chi-squared
Pseudo R-squared

Log Likelihood = -12173.466
Ind. Variables

Return on
Equity
Liquidity
Leverage
Size
Market-toBook
Price-toEarnings
Industry
Dummy
Growth
Resource
Dummy
Constant

24,224
37.850
0.0000
0.0016

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Z-score

Prob > l z l

.034

.0138

2.50

0.013

.007

.062

.024
-.059
.002

.008
.022
.003

2.99
-2.70
0.61

0.003
0.007
0.539

.008
-.101
-.003

.040
-.016
.007

.006

.006

0.31

0.756

-.029

.040

.012

.010

1.20

0.232

-.008

.031

.082

.038

2.13

0.033

.007

.156

.055

.034

1.61

0.108

-.012

.121

-1.464

.035

-41.67

0.000

-1.533

-1.395
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95% Confidence
Interval

The Control Model predicts only .16% of the variation of being a target or non-target
using the independent variables. The variables that are statistically significant (using a 5% cut
off p-value) in explaining whether a firm is a target are Return on Equity, Liquidity, Leverage,
and the Industry Dummy. The positive coefficient for the IDummy variable supports the
Industry Disturbance Hypothesis which suggests acquisitions cluster by industry (a positive
correlation). The positive coefficient for the Liquidity variable supports the Growth-Resource
Mismatch Hypothesis which ―implies that two types of firms are likely targets: low-growth,
resource-rich firms and high-growth, resource-poor firms‖ (Palepu 1986). Lastly, the negative
coefficient on the Leverage variable conflicts with the Growth-Resource Mismatch Hypothesis.
Overall, the Control Model cannot predict with enough reliability to be economically or
statistically significant.
4.2 Semi-Relaxed Model Summary
The Semi-Relaxed Model is similar to the Control Model. The Price-to-Earnings
variable is replaced with the Net Income variable in this model. This model includes
observations where the Return on Equity and Net Income variables have negative values
compared to the Control Model which omitted all negative observations. Net Income could be a
substitute for the P/E ratio, because we expect less profitable firms to be more likely to be taken
over. Also, when a firm reports negative net income, the P/E ratio does not exist (in any
meaningful way). Using the Net Income variable in place of the P/E ratio captures this effect.
The liquidity variable has also been squared in this model so the logit can complete the
estimation.
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There are 45,288 non-target and 7,267 target observations used in the Semi-Relaxed
Model estimation. Summary statistics for the target and non-target normalized data used in the
Semi-Relaxed Model are shown in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively. The Semi-Relaxed Model
has more than twice the number of observations as the Control Model possibly allowing for more
economically significant results. The estimated Semi-Relaxed Model is shown in Table 9.
Table 7: Target Normalized Data Used in the Semi-Relaxed Model

Variables

Mean

Return on Equity
Liquidity
Leverage
Size
Market-To-Book
Net Income
Industry Dummy
Growth-Resource Dummy

.032
-.423
.268
.237
-.024
.195
.646
.066

Std. Dev.

Minimum

.734
-32.692
1.218
-22.826
.863
-.984
1.658
-1.046
.648
-1.392
1.527
-12.784
.478
0
.249
0
Observations = 7,267

Maximum
10.851
38.551
24.459
34.753
31.897
27.195
1
1

Table 8: Non-target Normalized Data Used in the Semi-Relaxed Model

Variables

Mean

Return on Equity
Liquidity
Leverage
Size
Market-To-Book
Net Income
Industry Dummy
Growth-Resource Dummy

-.005
.068
-.043
-.038
.004
-.031
.814
.012

Std. Dev.

Minimum

1.036
-63.158
.942
-1.819
1.012
-26.104
.841
-1.308
1.045
-1.676
.882
-45.590
.389
0
.108
0
Observations = 45,288
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Maximum
18.397
47.586
53.562
24.583
79.518
22.665
1
1

4.2.1 Semi-Relaxed Model Estimation
Pi = Prob (TAKEOVERi = | ROEi, GRDUMMYi, LIQi, LEVi, IDUMMYi, SIZEi, MTBi, NIi)
where TARGETi = 1 if firm i was targeted and TARGETi = 0 if firm i was not targeted.
P(TARGETi) = α + β1ROEi + β2GRDUMMYi + β3LIQi + β4LEVi + β5IDUMMYi + β6SIZEi +
β7MTBi + β8NIi
The Semi-Relaxed Model explains less than 5.57% in the variation of whether a firm is a
target or non-target using the independent variables listed above. This provides somewhat
stronger results compared to the Control Model in terms of predicting target firms. In contrast
with the Control Model, every independent variable is statistically significant. The SemiRelaxed Model supports the Growth-Resource Mismatch Hypothesis and the Asset
Undervaluation Hypothesis, but provides results contrary to the Inefficient Management
Hypothesis, Size Hypothesis, and the Industry Disturbance Hypothesis.
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Table 9: Estimated Semi-Relaxed Model

Logistic Regression

Number of Observations
LR chi-squared(8)
Prob > Chi-squared
Pseudo R-squared

Log Likelihood = -19947.965
Ind. Variables

Return on
Equity
Liquidity
Leverage
Size
Market-toBook
Net Income
Industry
Dummy
Growth
Resource
Dummy
Constant

52,555
2351.05
0.0000
0.0557

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Z-score

Prob > l z l

95% Confidence
Interval

.139

.021

6.59

0.000

.097

.180

.002
.272
.154

.001
.019
.015

3.05
14.62
9.98

0.002
0.000
0.000

.001
.236
.124

.003
.309
.184

-.313

.031

-10.10

0.000

-.374

-.252

.075

.016

4.71

0.000

.044

.106

-.883

.028

-31.64

0.000

-.937

-.828

1.277

.078

16.49

0.000

1.125

1.429

-1.261

.023

-54.41

0.000

-1.306

-1.215

4.3 Relaxed Model Summary
The Relaxed (third) Model is similar to the Semi-Relaxed Model except it eases the
criterion for inclusion allowing observations in which any variables have negative values.
Approximately 7,267 target firms and 52,343 non-targets are used in estimating the Relaxed
Model. The target observations used in estimating the Relaxed Model are the same as in the
Semi-Relaxed Model. The loose criteria for the Relaxed Model are meant to capture more nontargets and potentially a more realistic and economically robust model. The summary statistics
for the target and non-target normalized data used in the third model are shown in Table 7 and
Table 10, respectively.
25

Table 10: Non-target Summary Statistics Used in the Relaxed Model

Variables

Mean

Return on Equity
Liquidity
Leverage
Size
Market-To-Book
Net Income
Industry Dummy
Growth-Resource Dummy

.001
.05
-.000
.004
.000
.004
.813
.053

Std. Dev.

Minimum

1.002
-45.524
1.300
-2.340
1.002
-36.243
1.042
-1.734
1.003
-57.150
1.064
-53.382
.390
0
.225
0
Observations = 52,343

Maximum
58.233
144.220
73.567
27.070
49.005
39.015
1
1

The logistic regression results for the Relaxed Model are shown in Table 11.
4.3.1 Relaxed Model Estimation
Pi = Prob (TAKEOVERi = | ROEi, GRDUMMYi, LIQi, LEVi, IDUMMYi, SIZEi, MTBi, NIi)
where TARGETi = 1 if firm i was targeted and TARGETi = 0 if firm i was not targeted.
P(TARGETi) = α + β1ROEi + β2GRDUMMYi + β3LIQi + β4LEVi + β5IDUMMYi + β6SIZEi +
β7MTBi + β8NIi
The Relaxed Model predicts about 5% of the variation in firm target likelihood being
explained by the independent variables. This five percent explanatory power is more predictive
than the Control Model, but, overall provides no meaningful reliability in predicting targets. All
but two of the variables are statistically significant in the Relaxed Model. Although this model
tests significant (due to a Chi-squared value below .05) and 6 of the 8 independent variables are
statistically significant, this model does not support any of the hypotheses discussed in Table 3
except for Liquidity. Overall, the third model cannot predict, with any economic significance,
the likelihood of a firm being a target.
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Table 11: Estimated Relaxed Model

Logistic Regression

Number of Observations
LR chi-squared(8)
Prob > Chi-squared
Pseudo R-squared

Log Likelihood = -21011.22
Ind. Variables

Return on
Equity
Liquidity
Leverage
Size
Market-toBook
Net Income
Industry
Dummy
Growth
Resource
Dummy
Constant

59,610
2173.78
0.0000
0.0492

Coefficient

Standard
Error

Z-score

Prob > l z l

-.015

.016

-0.97

0.334

-.045

.015

.059
.011
.259

.011
.015
.010

5.42
0.73
24.96

0.000
0.465
0.000

.038
-.018
.239

.080
.040
.279

.047

.011

4.12

0.000

.025

.070

-.208

.015

-14.16

0.000

-.237

-.179

-.870

.027

-31.73

0.000

-.923

-.816

-1.628

.114

-14.30

0.000

-1.851

-1.405

-1.334

.023

-58.91

0.000

-1.378

-1.290
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95% Confidence
Interval

5. CONCLUSION
A summary of the findings for this study are provided in Table 12. This study has found
minimal evidence supporting the six hypotheses (Inefficient Management, Growth-Resource
Mismatch, Industry Disturbance, Firm Size, Asset Undervaluation, and Price-to-Earnings) being
tested. The idea that ―past performance does not indicate future results‖ certainly appears to
apply in this area. The target likelihood predictors (independent variables) during the time
period January 3, 2000 through December 31, 2007 may have been affected by the Financial
Crisis of 2008. Although the crisis did not fully develop until 2008, the lax credit lending
standards, which were in place for years prior, may have played a role in much of the
performance of these firms.
Future researchers should be cautious during time periods during any sort of bubble or
possible systemic failure in the US financial system. Perhaps the implementation of some sort of
barometer of overall credit lending or commercial lending health metric should be used for future
model estimations. Upon further examination of the prior researchers‘ studies, they do not
comment on their goodness of fit measures, but rather its ―predictive ability‖. Since large
institutions do this type of research regularly, the chance to exploit any market irregularities
should be slim to none (which might be why prior researchers don‘t include a goodness of fit
measure in their findings). If a model exists which predicts with economic significance whether
or not a firm is a future target, the metrics used and defined appear to be more complex than
those used in the existing literature and in this study. After all, in an efficient, fair market
everyone has the same information and opportunities for easy profits are wiped out almost
instantly.
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Table 12: Summary of Results

Explanatory

Hypotheses

Semi-Relaxed

Relaxed

Model

Model

Control Model
Variables

Expectations

Return on Equity

-

GRDummy

+

Liquidity

+

Leverage

+

+
+

-

+

+

+

+

-

+

IDummy

+

+

-

-

Size

-

+

+

Market-to-Book

-

-

+

Price-to-Earnings

-

*

*

0.0557

0.0492

Pseudo-R-squared

0.0016

Note: * means the variable was not used in that model, ―+‖ means the coefficient was positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level, and ―-― means the coefficient was negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.
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